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N the areas of toxic tort and mass tort litigation, the 2009 to 2010
Survey period was notable not for landmark judicial decisions or
landscape-changing legislation, but for the emergence of new mass
torts of enormous potential scope and significance. In late 2009 and early
2010, the Toyota Motor Corporation recalled several of its models based
on suspicions that defective design of the floor mats or the gas pedals in
the vehicles created a risk of sudden, unintended acceleration.' The reve-
lations prompted a deluge of suits in Texas state and federal courts and
elsewhere by Toyota owners alleging economic harm from diminution of
their vehicles' value attributable to the defects. In April 2010, an off-
shore oil rig leased by BP Exploration and Production Inc. (formerly
known as British Petroleum) exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in
the deaths of eleven rig workers and an unprecedented environmental
catastrophe in the Gulf.2 The plaintiffs who filed suit included commer-
cial fisherman, hotel owners, recreational sportsmen, and even restaurant
* B.A., Columbia University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas, and Lecturer in Law on Mass Tort Litigation, Southern Methodist University School
of Law.
1. Angus MacKenzie & Scott Evans, The Toyota Recall Crisis, MOTOR TREND, Jan.
2010, available at http://www.motortrend.com/features/autonews/2010/112_1001_toyota-
recall-crisis/printerjfriendly.html.
2. William M. Welch & Chris Joyner, Memorial service honors 11 dead oil rig work-
ers, USA TODAY (May 25, 2010, 11:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-
05-25-oil-spill-victims-memorialN.htm#.
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owners and travel agents in distant locations.3 Although BP promptly
established a $20 billion fund intended to compensate victims of the spill
outside the tort system,4 the Gulf oil spill of 2010 will unquestionably
spawn litigation that will present many novel legal issues and may take
years to resolve.
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court did not issue any
opinions specifically addressing mass tort and toxic tort litigation. The
Texas intermediate appellate courts continued to show skepticism toward
claims of asbestos-related injury and demanded factual predicate for dis-
covery in toxic tort cases. After a few eventful years and with enor-
mously significant litigation on the horizon, the Survey period could fairly
be described as the calm before the storm.
I. CASE MANAGEMENT AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION ORDERS
On September 29, 2009, Toyota Motor Corporation and its related
companies issued a safety advisory warning that floor mats on certain
models of Toyota vehicles might entrap accelerator pedals, causing the
vehicles to accelerate unintentionally. 5 Soon after issuing the advisory,
Toyota instituted a voluntary recall of affected Toyota vehicles. In Janu-
ary 2010, Toyota issued a second voluntary recall related to the accelera-
tor pedals themselves. 6 Not surprisingly, these disclosures sparked the
filing of hundreds of suits against Toyota based on these possible defects
in state and federal courts across the country. 7 Most of the cases alleged
economic loss as a result of the defect, but in several cases the plaintiffs
alleged that one or both of these defects caused a catastrophic crash re-
sulting in personal injury or wrongful death.8 The United States Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation quickly consolidated the federal litiga-
tion in the United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia. 9 The federal MDL included claims of economic harm and left open
the possibility of adding claims of personal injury or wrongful death.
In Texas, Toyota moved the state panel on multidistrict litigation to
create an MDL docket of sudden acceleration cases. 10 Plaintiffs in cases
3. See, e.g., Michael Kunzelman, New Orleans Judge to Handle Most Gulf Oil Spill
Lawsuits, PRESS-REGISTER, Aug. 11, 2010, at A10 (listing examples of businesses operated
by plaintiffs who filed hundreds of claims against BP after the oil spill).
4. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Administering the Fund, a Master Mediator, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2010, at A18.
5. Mackenzie, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Lawyers Selected in Toyota Case, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 15, 2010,
at C.
8. Id.
9. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, and
Prods. Liab. Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2010).
10. In re Toyota Unintended Acceleration Litig., No. 10-032 (Tex. Jud. Pan. Mult. Li-
tig. July 12, 2010), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MDL/2010/0342/
MDLOpinion-07122010.PDF.
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alleging economic harm joined the motion; two plaintiffs who had filed
wrongful death cases opposed the motion, arguing that the cases were
inappropriate for MDL treatment because they did not arise from the
same catastrophic event and involved different vehicle models and claims
of defect. The Texas panel granted the motion to transfer and consolidate
the cases for pretrial proceedings, finding that the cases, despite their dif-
ferences, presented numerous common questions of fact and that transfer
would "serve the goals of convenience, efficiency, and justice."'" The
court assigned the Toyota unintended acceleration docket to Judge Rob-
ert Schaffer of Harris County, Texas. 12
The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil rig leased by BP
Exploration and Production Inc. in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010
cost eleven lives and resulted in the largest oil spill, measured by barrels
of oil released, in the history of the petroleum industry. 13 The full extent
of the environmental damage will not be reliably ascertainable for years;
the full extent of the litigation engendered by the spill will likely be un-
known for a similar period. 14 BP's efforts to cap the deepwater well were
only belatedly successful.15 The company was far more productive in its
effort to cabin its potential liability for economic loss and environmental
harm, taking the novel approach of setting aside a $20 billion fund to be
administered by iconic mass tort expert Kenneth Feinberg as a substitute
for tort remedies. 16
Of course (to paraphrase a well-worn sports clich6) one cannot stop
mass tort litigation, one can only hope to contain it,17 and the Deepwater
Horizon spill is no exception. Scores of cases, including class actions as
well as individual claims, were filed in the federal courts in Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, South Carolina, and Texas.18 The plain-
tiffs in these cases alleged economic loss resulting from the spill. The
United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation promptly trans-
ferred and consolidated these cases in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana before Judge Carl Barbier. 19
Several cases involving at least thirty-two injured workers were filed in
the Texas state courts. BP filed a motion with the Texas Panel on Mul-
11. Id. at *4.
12. In re Toyota Unintended Acceleration Litig., No. 10-0342 (Tex. Jud. Pan. Mult.
Litig., order of June 25, 2010), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MDL/
2010/0342/AppointmentofPretrialjudge-06252010.PDF.
13. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, Scien-
tists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14.
14. See id.
15. Clifford Krauss, With Little Fanfare, Well is Plugged with Cement, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2010, at A13.
16. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Administering the Fund, a Master Mediator, N.Y. TIMES, June
17, 2010, at A18.
17. Memorable quotes for "SportsCenter", IMDB, (last visited April 9, 2011), http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0136668/quotes (attributing the phrase to Dan Patrick).
18. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on




tidistrict Litigation to consolidate these cases before a single pretrial
judge.20 The motion is pending as of this writing.
B. DISCOVERY
The success of a toxic tort claim almost invariably depends on the abil-
ity of the plaintiff to prove facts uniquely in the possession of the defen-
dant or an uncooperative third party. The plaintiff must prove exposure
to a particular toxic product, often supplied to the plaintiff's employer in
bulk or unlabeled. 21 The plaintiff's employer or the employer's supplier
are much more likely to have this information than the plaintiff. More
recently, the Texas courts have required the plaintiff to present some
mathematical estimate of the amount (or "dose") of the toxin to which
the plaintiff was exposed.2 2 Again, while the plaintiff's employer or its
supplier may have measured or estimated the extent of the toxic expo-
sure, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would possess this type of evidence.
The plaintiff must also demonstrate the defendant's culpability. If the
defendant is a premises owner or an employer, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant knew of and failed to protect the plaintiff from the
dangers posed by exposure to the toxic substance.23 If the defendant is a
product manufacturer, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew
of the hazard but failed to warn of it24 or could have designed the toxic
product differently but failed to do so. 25 The very nature of the allega-
tion-that the defendant knew of but concealed its awareness of the haz-
ard to which the plaintiff was exposed-indicates that this evidence is
likely to be found deep within the defendant's files, not in places to which
the plaintiff has access.
Thus, plaintiffs in many toxic tort cases depend on open discovery to
develop the evidence to substantiate the allegations necessary to impose
liability. On the other hand, defendants in toxic tort cases typically con-
demn the plaintiff's efforts to search their files as overbroad and unduly
burdensome "fishing expeditions" unlikely to uncover admissible evi-
dence. For the past fifteen years, the Texas Supreme Court and the lower
courts in Texas have been receptive to such defense arguments, narrowly
defining the scope of permissible discovery in toxic tort cases. 2 6
20. Motion for Transfer for Consolidated or Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, at *1;
In re Deepwater Horizon Incident Litig., No. 10-0376 (May 21, 2010), available at http://
www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/MDL/2010/0376/MotionToTransfer.PDF.
21. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765, 771 (Tex. 2007); see discus-
sion infra Part lI.B.
22. Id. at 773.
23. 4 LAWRENCE G. CETRULO, Toxic TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 42:8 (2010).
24. 1 LAWRENCE G. CETRULO, Toxic TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 2:16.1 (2010).
25. Id. at § 2:8.
26. See, e.g., In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. 2003) (denying discovery in a
benzene case because the requests "lack reasonable limitations as to time and subject mat-
ter"); In re Am. Optical, 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (finding an abuse of discretion in
the trial court's order requiring the defendant in an asbestos case "to produce virtually all
documents regarding its products for a fifty-year period"); Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898
S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995) (in a case alleging that the defendant's employee died from
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This trend continued during the Survey period, with a twist. In a trio of
mandamus proceedings arising from the same wrongful death case, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals predictably defined the scope of permissible
discovery in a toxic tort case narrowly for the plaintiff, but added that the
trial court had unduly restricted the defendant's discovery efforts. The
three proceedings all bear the same style, In re Univar USA Inc., and
were each brought by the same defendant (Univar) in a case in which the
plaintiffs claimed that their decedent's fatal leukemia was caused by his
exposure to benzene supplied by the defendant to the decedent's employ-
ers. In Univar I, the court of appeals held that the trial court abused its
discretion in shielding from discovery the plaintiffs' settlement agree-
ments with other defendants in the case.27 The trial court had accepted
the plaintiffs' argument that the agreements were relevant only to estab-
lish Univar's settlement credit and ordered the plaintiffs to disclose to
Univar only the identity of the settling parties and the aggregate amount
of the settlements. 28 The court of appeals found that Univar was entitled
to relevant portions of the settlement agreements themselves so it could
verify the amounts of each settlement.2 9 Additionally, the court pointed
out that the settlement agreements could attempt to deprive Univar of a
proper settlement credit by allocating all or a disproportionate part of the
settlement amount to punitive damages; Univar should be permitted to
discover and challenge any such allocation.30 Finally, the court noted that
the settlement agreements might furnish Univar with a basis for arguing
that a particular witness is biased (for example, by providing the witness
with an incentive to place blame on Univar by providing a reduction in
the settlement amount owed for amounts assessed against or recovered
from Univar).31 Because the settlement agreements might contain such
revelations, the court of appeals held, the trial court abused its discretion
in declining to order production.32
While arguably allowing Univar's fishing expedition into the contents
of written settlement agreements, the Beaumont Court of Appeals pro-
hibited the plaintiffs from conducting their own expedition to discover
evidence of Univar's knowledge of the hazards of its products and the
identity of the suppliers of benzene to the decedent's employer. 33 The
cancer caused by exposure to asbestos and benzene, a request for production of all docu-
ments written by the defendant's corporate safety director was overbroad because it was
not limited to "time, place, or subject matter"); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 146 S.W.3d
328, 334 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.) (discovery requests, in asbestos case, for all
workers' compensation files and board of directors resolutions mentioning asbestos was
overbroad because they were not tied "to the type of exposure, a reasonable time period,
the relevant location, and the particular products or work involved").
27. 311 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, 2010, no pet.) ("Univar I").
28. Id. at 178-79.
29. Id. at 182.
30. Id. at 181.
31. Id. at 182.
32. Id. at 182-83.




plaintiffs had produced extrinsic evidence that two of the decedent's em-
ployers may have purchased benzene from Univar from 1966 through
1968 and 1970 through 1971. The plaintiffs "largely" limited the scope of
their discovery requests of Univar, including a corporate deposition and a
subpoena duces tecum, to this time period. 34 But in Univar II, the court
of appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to strictly limit the
discovery to the times and locations suggested by the extrinsic evidence. 35
In Univar III, the court considered the trial court's order allowing the
corporate deposition of Texas Solvents, a predecessor of Univar, to dis-
cover whether Texas Solvents sold benzene to the decedent's employer
between 1970 and 1971.36 To support their discovery request, the plain-
tiffs presented deposition testimony of a witness stating "I think" Texas
Solvents supplied benzene to the decedent's employer, although the an-
swer was only his "best guess."'37 Unimpressed, the court of appeals
found that this evidence "fails to raise a reasonable possibility that ben-
zene from Texas Solvent was present" at the decedent's employer during
the relevant time period, and ruled that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in allowing the deposition to include Texas Solvents.38 Justice
Gaultney dissented from the court's decision in Univar III, arguing that
the court "should not be ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence" in
considering the threshold issue of whether discovery should be
permitted.39
It is reasonable to anticipate that the Texas courts will continue to re-
strict plaintiffs' efforts to obtain broad discovery in toxic tort litigation. It
will be interesting to see whether the scope of permissible discovery for
defendants in the same litigation will continue to expand.
C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Because most toxic tort cases involve latent injuries which become ap-
parent years after the toxic exposure, the viability of toxic tort litigation
depends on the availability of a discovery rule under which the statute of
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff learns of or should have dis-
covered the injury and its cause. Although courts in Texas routinely ap-
plied the discovery rule in toxic tort cases for many years,40 the Texas
Supreme Court first expressly recognized the applicability of the rule in
toxic tort cases in a pair of cases decided in 1998, Childs v. Haussecker4'
and Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel.4 2 Under the rule announced in
Childs, the statute of limitations in a latent occupational disease case does
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 311 S.W.3d 186, 186 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2010, no pet.) ("Univar III").
37. Id. at 188.
38. Id. at 188-89.
39. Id. at 189 (Gaultney, J., dissenting).
40. See, e.g., Strickland v. Johns-Manville Int'l. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215,218 (S.D. Tex.
1978).
41. 974 S.W.2d 31, 31 (Tex. 1998).
42. 875 S.W.2d 311, 311 (Tex. 1994).
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not begin to run until the plaintiff's symptoms "manifest themselves to a
degree or for a duration that would put a reasonable person on notice
that he or she suffers from some injury" and the plaintiff knows or should
know that the injury is "likely work-related. '43
Although it is rare for a court to hold as a matter of law that a latent
injury and its cause should have been discovered before a formal diagno-
sis, the El Paso Court of Appeals did just that in Rodriguez v. Crowell.44
The plaintiff in Rodriguez alleged that she developed an unpleasant and
ultimately disabling bacterial infection, known as psitticosis, from her ex-
posure to pigeon droppings at the office building where she worked.
45
She noticed symptoms of the disease about a year or two after beginning
her employment at the building in 1995 and noticed that her symptoms
lessened when she left the building, so she began seeking assignments out
of town in 1997.46 Over the years, she observed pigeons, dust, and debris
all around the building, and was aware that co-workers were circulating
e-mails about "air quality issues."'47 In 2002, she received an e-mail from
the State describing procedures for filing a workers' compensation
claim.48 In July 2003, she was diagnosed with psitticosis by a local doctor
and advised to terminate her employment at the office building.49 In
February 2005, she filed suit against the owners and operators of the
building. 50 Although the plaintiff filed within two years after the first
diagnosis of an injury related to her employment, the trial court granted
summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. 51
The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment.52
Tracking the language of Childs, the court held the evidence established
as a matter of law that more than two years before the plaintiff filed suit,
her symptoms "manifested to a degree and for a duration that would put
a reasonable person on notice that she had been injured and that. . . the
injury was likely work-related. '53 The court acknowledged that the plain-
tiff was not diagnosed with a work-related injury until less than two years
before she filed suit, but citing Childs, noted that "the law does not re-
quire a final diagnosis" to trigger the running of limitations. 54 The Rodri-
guez opinion reflects a new willingness of the Texas courts to find as a
matter of law that a plaintiff had constructive knowledge of a toxic injury
before diagnosis.
43. Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 40-41.
44. 319 S.W.3d 751, 757-58 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2009, pet. denied).
45. Id. at 753.
46. Id.





52. Id. at 758.
53. Id. at 757-58.
54. Id. at 758.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Dum" To WARN: THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DEFENSE
In Texas, as in most states, the duty of drug manufacturers to warn of
dangers associated with the use of their products has long been circum-
scribed by the learned intermediary doctrine. 55 Under that defensive the-
ory, the drug manufacturer satisfies its duty to the ultimate consumer by
providing an adequate warning to the prescribing physician, who is in a
better position to understand the benefits and risks of a particular treat-
ment and to receive and interpret information about possible adverse ef-
fects. 56 But in an age of universally accessible media, in which
pharmaceutical companies brazenly advertise to the public prescription
remedies for such sensitive conditions as "erectile dysfunction" (formerly
known simply as "impotence"), "restless leg syndrome," and depression,
courts57 and commentators 58 have increasingly questioned whether the
rationale for the defense continues to apply.
In Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton,59 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
called into doubt the continued vitality of the learned intermediary doc-
trine in many pharmaceutical failure to warn cases in Texas, suggesting
that the defense "is based on images of health care that no longer ex-
ist."'60 The plaintiff in Centocor sought treatment options for relief of her
Crohn's disease, and her doctor prescribed a new drug called Remicade,
manufactured by Centocor, to be administered intravenously by another
physician. When the plaintiff went to the physician's clinic to receive her
first dose of Remicade, the physician's assistant played for her a video-
tape made by Centacor touting the benefits of the drug and identifying
some possible risks. The videotape did not mention the risk that a person
receiving Remicade would develop lupus-like symptoms; the package in-
sert provided to the prescribing physician did identify such a risk, though
the parties disputed whether the physician explained that risk to the pa-
tient. After receiving several doses of Remicade, the plaintiff developed
severe lupus-like symptoms and stopped taking the drug. She sued
Centocor, claiming that the company fraudulently induced her to take
55. See David G. Owen, Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in
the Healthcare Debate, 42 CONN. L. REV. 733, 761 (2010) (describing the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine as "an established fixture in American products liability law").
56. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano, 28 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2000, no pet.).
57. See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 908-10 (W. Va.
2007); Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (N.J. 1999); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1214-24 (D.N.M. 2008) (applying New Mexico law).
58. See, e.g., Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74
BROOK. L. REV. 839, 894 (2009) (noting that critics argue that the doctrine "fails to take
into account changes in the delivery of health care services"); James Ottavio Castagnera &
Richard Ryan Gerner, The Gradual Enfeeblement of the Learned Intermediary Rule and
the Argument in Favor of Abandoning It Entirely, 36 TORT & INs. L.J. 119, 120 (2000)
(observing that increasing consumer awareness and the evolving doctor-patient relation-
ship has eroded the rationale for the doctrine).
59. 310 S.W.3d 476, 476 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.).
60. Id. at 480.
[Vol. 64
Toxic Torts and Mass Torts
Remicade through its promotional videotape which, as noted, omitted
any reference to the risk of developing lupus-like symptoms. The jury
found Centacor liable and awarded the plaintiff and her husband almost
five million dollars in actual and punitive damages. Centacor appealed,
arguing among other things that the learned intermediary doctrine barred
the claim as a matter of law.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against
Centocor, rejecting the contention that the company satisfied its legal
duty to the plaintiff by providing adequate warnings of possible side ef-
fects to the prescribing physician.61 The court noted that the learned in-
termediary doctrine rested on a series of assumptions about the
relationship between doctors and patients that no longer prevail in mod-
ern society.62 When the doctrine was first developed, the court observed,
"drug manufacturers did not advertise to the general public."'63 The doc-
trine is based in large part on the beliefs that only a physician is qualified
to weigh the risks and benefits of a prescription drug; that the physician is
in the best or perhaps even the only position to receive and interpret a
warning of a drug's side effects; and that confidence in the doctor-patient
relationship would be undermined by recognizing a patient's independent
ability to make medical decisions. 64 These assumptions, the court rea-
soned, are actually contradicted by the prevalence of direct-to-consumer
marketing by drug manufacturers such as that employed by Centacor in
this case.65 Expressly following the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in a recent similar case,66 the court of appeals ruled that the
learned intermediary doctrine will not bar a failure-to-warn claim "when
a drug manufacturer engages in direct-to-consumer advertising that
fraudulently touts the drug's efficacy while failing to warn of the risks."'67
Whether the Texas Supreme Court will condone the abolition of the
learned intermediary defense in this context remains to be seen.
B. SCIENTIFIC CAUSATION IN Toxic TORT CASES
Four years ago, in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, the Texas Supreme
Court provided specific guidance on the type of proof needed to support
a finding of legal causation in an asbestosis case. 68 The plaintiff in such a
case, the supreme court held, must do more than show isolated or even
frequent exposures to the defendant's asbestos-containing product;
rather, the plaintiff must present "[dlefendant-specific evidence relating
to the approximate dose to which the plaintiff was exposed, coupled with
61. Id. at 481. The court modified the judgment to eliminate the jury's award for fu-
ture pain and mental anguish, which the court found unsupported by the evidence. Id. at
518-21.
62. Id. at 507-08.
63. Id. at 506.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 508.
66. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245, 1245 (N.J. 1999).
67. Centocor, 310 S.W.3d at 499.
68. 232 S.W.3d 765, 773 (Tex. 2007).
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evidence that the dose was a substantial factor in causing the asbestos-
related disease."' 69 Two months later, in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Ste-
phens, the Houston First District Court of Appeals applied this guidance
in a mesothelioma case, reversing a jury verdict based on its conclusion
that the plaintiff had failed to present any "quantitative evidence of expo-
sure and any scientific evidence of the minimum exposure level leading to
an increased risk of development of mesothelioma. 70
During this Survey period, the Texas appellate courts continued to hold
plaintiffs in mesothelioma cases to the exacting standard of proving cau-
sation applied by the First District Court of Appeals in Stephens. In
Smith v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co.,71 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals af-
firmed a summary judgment based on its conclusion that the plaintiff had
not produced legally sufficient evidence that her deceased husband's ex-
posure to defendant Kelly-Moore's asbestos-containing drywall products
was a substantial cause of his fatal mesothelioma.72 The plaintiff had
presented detailed evidence that her husband used Kelly-Moore drywall
products on a frequent and regular basis and was in proximity to them as
they emitted asbestos dust. She submitted proof that the products were
tested and contained eight percent chrysotile asbestos and that the use of
the products generated levels of chrysotile asbestos above the limit set by
the federal agency charged with regulating toxic exposures. She also
showed that chrysotile fibers were found in her husband's lung tissue af-
ter his death. The court held that although the plaintiff's evidence of the
amount of her decedent's asbestos exposure was sufficient, 73 the plaintiff
failed to present evidence that the type of asbestos contained in Kelly-
Moore's products (chrysotile) was associated with an increased risk of
developing mesothelioma. 74 The court thus held that the plaintiff "failed
to adduce sufficient evidence that [the decedent] had been exposed to
chrysotile asbestos in Kelly-Moore's drywall joint compounds in a dose
sufficient to have been a substantial factor in causing his
mesothelioma. ' '75
In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Bostic,76 the Dallas Court of Appeals re-
versed a jury verdict in favor of the survivors of a man who developed
mesothelioma at the age of forty after spending "his entire life" around
drywall products, including an asbestos-containing joint compound made
by Georgia-Pacific. 77 The decedent testified by deposition that his expo-
sure began at the age of five while watching and helping his father per-
form drywall work and continued into his adulthood when he personally
69. Id.
70. 239 S.W.3d 304, 321 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
71. 307 S.W.3d 829, 829 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.).
72. Id. at 839.
73. Id. at 836.
74. Id. at 839.
75. Id. at 830.
76. 320 S.W.3d 588, 588 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. filed). The law firm with whom
the author was formerly employed was and is lead counsel for the plaintiff in this case.
77. Id. at 592.
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worked on the same types of jobs. His father testified that he used Geor-
gia-Pacific joint compound "ninety-eight percent of the time that he did
drywall work."' 78 Examining the testimony in detail, however, the court
of appeals found only three specific jobs on which the decedent and his
father worked together with drywall.79 The court found this to be "insuf-
ficient evidence of [the decedent's] frequent and regular exposure to
Georgia-Pacific's asbestos-containing joint compound during the relevant
time period."' 80 The court also found legally inadequate the plaintiff's
quantitative evidence that he was exposed to levels of asbestos from
Georgia-Pacific's products that placed him at risk of developing mesothe-
lioma.81 The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs presented expert tes-
timony from an industrial hygienist stating that tests of Georgia-Pacific
products showed that they released hazardous amounts of asbestos fibers,
but found that the tests did not establish the decedent's level of exposure
"because of the many variables in the circumstances of a given work ac-
tivity and location of the activity."'82 The court thus held the evidence
"insufficient to provide quantitative evidence of [the decedent's] expo-
sure to . . .Georgia-Pacific's asbestos-containing joint compound or to
establish [the decedent's] exposure was in amounts sufficient to increase
his risk of developing mesothelioma. '8 3
The Smith and Bostic decisions indicate that the Texas courts have
come a long way from the days in which evidence of "any exposure" to
asbestos would support a finding of causation in a mesothelioma case.84
In the current legal environment, even detailed proof of heavy exposure
to asbestos is not enough to guarantee a victim of mesothelioma a jury
determination of whether the exposure caused this "signature disease. '85
Bucking the trend of requiring demonstrably reliable proof of causa-
tion as a prerequisite for proceeding to trial in a toxic tort case, the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in favor of a
defendant in Pink v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 86 In Pink, the plaintiff
alleged that her deceased husband's fatal renal cancer was caused by his
exposure to benzene while employed by Goodyear and that Goodyear
was grossly negligent in allowing the exposure. Goodyear filed a no-evi-
dence motion for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 166a(i) challenging, among other components of the claim, the legal
sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegation that her husband's cancer was
78. Id. at 593.
79. Id. at 593-94.
80. Id. at 599.
81. Id. at 601.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Celotex Corp. v. Tate, 797 S.W.2d 197, 204 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990,
writ dism'd) (if defendant "supplied any of the asbestos to which [the decedent] was ex-
posed, then appellees have adequately met their burden of proof.").
85. Smith v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co., 307 S.W.3d 829, 834 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2010, no pet.) (describing mesothelioma as a "signature disease").
86. 324 S.W.3d 290, 302 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2010, pet. filed).
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caused by his exposure to benzene at Goodyear. In response, the plain-
tiff initially produced deposition testimony that Goodyear workers such
as her husband washed their hands in benzene in the late 1960s and early
1970s. Within seven days of the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiff
produced an affidavit of her husband's treating physician attributing her
husband's cancer to his exposure to benzene. The physician's affidavit,
however, contained no reasoning supporting the conclusion but merely
stated that the physician had reviewed the decedent's medical records,
the deposition testimony of the decedent and three of his co-workers, and
"scientific literature" in "rendering this opinion" of a causal relationship
between the workplace exposure and the injury. 87 The defendant ob-
jected to the affidavit as untimely and unreliable. The trial court granted
summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.
A majority of the Beaumont Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff
had produced sufficient evidence of causation to withstand summary
judgment.88 The majority first found that the trial court had implicitly
overruled Goodyear's timeliness objection to the physician's affidavit by
noting in its summary judgment order that it had considered "all of the
evidence on file" in ruling on the motion.8 9 The majority then rejected
Goodyear's contention that the physician's affidavit was conclusory and
thus legally insufficient evidence of a causal relation between the dece-
dent's exposure to benzene and his fatal renal cancer.90 The majority
acknowledged that the physician's affidavit did not itself disclose the spe-
cific scientific literature that he consulted and did not describe the con-
tent of the literature, but found that this omission was not fatal.91
Instead, the "implicit assertion ... that the scientific literature reviewed
supports his opinion" rendered the affidavit not conclusory.92 Finally, the
majority found it could not sustain the summary judgment on the basis
that the affidavit was scientifically unreliable and therefore inadmissible
because Goodyear had failed to obtain a ruling on those objections.93
The majority noted that the admissibility of expert testimony and the pro-
priety of summary judgment are governed by different standards of re-
view-abuse of discretion and legal sufficiency (de novo) review,
respectively-and reasoned that clarity and the nonmovant's right to a
fair opportunity to be heard require that the admissibility and legal suffi-
ciency objections be considered and decided separately. 94
Chief Justice McKeithen dissented from the reversal of summary judg-
ment in favor of Goodyear, finding the affidavit of the decedent's treating
physician "no evidence" that benzene caused his renal cancer.95 The "ab-
87. Id. at 296.
88. Id. at 302.
89. Id. at 294.
90. Id. at 298.
91. Id. at 297.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 302.
94. Id. at 301.
95. Id. at 303 (McKeithen, C.J., dissenting).
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sence of any explanation of how the records, testimony, and literature
supported his opinion," Chief Justice McKeithen reasoned, rendered the
opinion of causation "mere ipse dixit of a credentialed witness" entitled
to no weight. 96 Because the affidavit was conclusory and amounted to no
evidence of causation, Chief Justice McKeithen argued that a hearing on
the admissibility of the affidavit was not required. 97
Most likely, Pink does not reflect a new judicial tolerance for difficult
claims that a toxic exposure caused a disease, but rather stands as an
anomaly in the Texas legal landscape. Victims of mesothelioma and other
diseases associated with toxic exposures can expect to continue to experi-
ence rough sledding in the Texas courts.
C. SECURITIES FRAUD BASED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN
MASS TORT LITIGATION
This Survey primarily focuses on developments within toxic and mass
tort litigation and typically does not address the indirect effects that par-
ticular mass tort cases have had on the legal community or the economy.
It must be acknowledged though, that increasingly the emergence of po-
tential mass tort liability engenders litigation not just by victims of the
mass tort but by also those whose financial position was harmed by the
litigation itself. Such claims have become almost routine in the pharma-
ceutical industry. 98 In Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., the Fifth Circuit considered the viability of a class action
predicated in part on the claim that Halliburton fraudulently understated
its involvement in the so-called "mother of all mass torts,"99 asbestos liti-
gation, to the detriment of investors who allegedly paid an inflated price
for Halliburton stock. 100 Halliburton had merged with Dresser Industries
in 1998; Dresser's subsidiary, Harbison-Walker Refractories Company,
bore potential liability for asbestos-related claims. In May 2001, Halli-
burton reported that it had reserved approximately $30 million to cover
its potential asbestos-related liability resulting from its acquisition of
Dresser. Later in 2001, Halliburton publicly disclosed that it had substan-
tially increased its reserve for asbestos liability, that it had incurred a jury
verdict for $21.3 million in an asbestos case, and that judgments against
Dresser had been entered in other asbestos cases. The class plaintiffs al-
leged that these later disclosures caused Halliburton's stock price to drop,
that the price they had previously paid for Halliburton stock had been
inflated by Halliburton's misrepresentation of the scope of its potential
96. Id. at 304 (McKeithen, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 303-04.
98. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1784 (2010) (involving the
anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 621 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (involving anti-inflammatory drugs Celebrex and Bextra).
99. See Frances E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV.
1721, 1756 (2002).
100. 597 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011).
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asbestos liability in May 2001, and that Halliburton was liable for the
drop in its stock price.101
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of class certifica-
tion.102 The court noted that the plaintiffs had to show that the com-
pany's misrepresentation or omission materially affected the price of the
stock not only to prevail on the merits but also to demonstrate entitle-
ment to class certification.' 0 3 Moreover, it was not enough to show that
the stock price declined after disclosure of negative news about the com-
pany; rather, the plaintiff must show that the loss "likely resulted from
the specific correction of the fraud and not because of some independent
reason."'0 4 The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to make such a
showing.10 5 Nothing in Halliburton's later disclosures, the court found,
demonstrated that the company's announcement of its asbestos reserve in
May 2001 was false, and "merely raising the asbestos reserves does not
show that those prior reserve estimates were intentionally misleading."' 10 6
Similarly, Halliburton's disclosure of verdicts and judgments against it
and its subsidiary did not reveal that its previous representations regard-
ing its potential liability in asbestos litigation were fraudulent.10 7 Be-
cause the plaintiffs failed to prove "loss causation" on these disclosures
and in other respects, the court held that the district court properly re-
fused to certify the class.' 08 Despite the plaintiffs' defeat in this case,
investors whose shares lose value after the revelation of an alleged mass
tort will undoubtedly continue to seek redress in the courts.
III. CONCLUSION
The previous discussion demonstrates that as far as toxic torts and mass
torts are concerned, this Survey period was a relatively quiet one. No
significant federal or state legislative initiatives were enacted or seriously
considered, and the Texas courts followed established legal trails rather
than blaze new ones. The emergence of the Toyota sudden acceleration
cases and the British Petroleum oil spill cases, not to mention other disas-
ters yet to occur, promises that in contrast, the next Survey period will
almost certainly be an active one.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 335.
104. Id. at 336.
105. Id. at 344.
106. Id. at 340.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 344.
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